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Abstract
In the Rubber Hand Illusion, the feeling of ownership of a rubber hand displaced from a participant’s real occluded hand is
evoked by synchronously stroking both hands with paintbrushes. A change of perceived finger location towards the rubber
hand (proprioceptive drift) has been reported to correlate with this illusion. To measure the time course of proprioceptive
drift during the Rubber Hand Illusion, we regularly interrupted stroking (performed by robot arms) to measure perceived
finger location. Measurements were made by projecting a probe dot into the field of view (using a semi-transparent mirror)
and asking participants if the dot is to the left or to the right of their invisible hand (Experiment 1) or to adjust the position
of the dot to that of their invisible hand (Experiment 2). We varied both the measurement frequency (every 10 s, 40 s, 120 s)
and the mode of stroking (synchronous, asynchronous, just vision). Surprisingly, with frequent measurements,
proprioceptive drift occurs not only in the synchronous stroking condition but also in the two control conditions
(asynchronous stroking, just vision). Proprioceptive drift in the synchronous stroking condition is never higher than in the
just vision condition. Only continuous exposure to asynchronous stroking prevents proprioceptive drift and thus replicates
the differences in drift reported in the literature. By contrast, complementary subjective ratings (questionnaire) show that
the feeling of ownership requires synchronous stroking and is not present in the asynchronous stroking condition. Thus,
subjective ratings and drift are dissociated. We conclude that different mechanisms of multisensory integration are
responsible for proprioceptive drift and the feeling of ownership. Proprioceptive drift relies on visuoproprioceptive
integration alone, a process that is inhibited by asynchronous stroking, the most common control condition in Rubber Hand
Illusion experiments. This dissociation implies that conclusions about feelings of ownership cannot be drawn from
measuring proprioceptive drift alone.
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Introduction
The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) is a tantalizing illusion, where
the feeling that a rubber hand belongs to one’s body (feeling of
ownership) is brought about by stroking a visible rubber hand
synchronously to the participant’s own occluded hand. In the
first work describing this phenomenon, Botvinick and Cohen [1]
showed that two types of measures are affected. Participants
rated the subjective experience to own the rubber hand high in a
questionnaire if stroking was synchronous but not if stroking was
asynchronous. In a second experiment, perceived position of the
participant’s left index finger was measured by an inter-manual
reaching task in darkness. A displacement of reaches towards the
rubber hand occurred in the case of synchronous stimulation, but
not in the case of asynchronous stimulation. This displacement
effect has been referred to as proprioceptive drift (e.g., [2]). In their
study, the magnitude of the proprioceptive drift correlated with the
strength of the feeling of ownership reported in the questionnaire.
This proprioceptive drift is usually thought of as a ‘‘three-way
interaction between vision, touch, and proprioception’’ [1], in
which synchronous stroking (touch) evokes the proprioceptive
feeling of the own hand to be displaced towards the seen (visual)
rubber hand. Botvinick and Cohen [1] regard proprioceptive drift
as evidence in favor of a connectionist model of trimodal pro-
cessing with all three sensory inputs (vision, proprioception and
touch) requiring each other. The model, however, is not further
specified. They assert that ‘‘the illusion’s spurious reconciliation of
visual and tactile inputs relies upon a distortion of position sense’’
(p. 756). Makin, Holmes and Ehrsson [3] propose a more general
model of peripersonal space that separates processes of mere
visuoproprioceptive integration from those that involve the tactile
modality as well; such visuoproprioceptive spatial recalibration
effects have been observed in studies with fake or displaced hands
even if no touch and feeling of ownership was involved (visual
capture of proprioception, e.g., [4–7]). Makin et al. [3] propose
that ‘‘the referral of touch towards the dummy hand […] might in
itself be sufficient to induce a (bottom-up) feeling of ownership
over the dummy hand’’ (p. 6) and that visuotactile synchrony of
stroking then ‘‘further increases the weighting of vision over touch
and proprioception in hand position’’ (p. 6). Sustained stroking
may thus gradually increase proprioceptive drift in the RHI as
Tsakiris and Haggard [2] report. In a recent review, Tsakiris [8]
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inputs are compared to the body state prior to visuoproprioceptive
integration to decide whether the multisensory inputs are con-
gruent. The model thus accounts for influences of current body
state, such as visual and postural congruency. Most theories of
body image stress that body perception is a complex problem and
would not advocate a direct connection between different func-
tional domains of using and perceiving our body (e.g., what we
perceive to be part of our body vs. where we perceive our limbs
to be located). Yet, current models assume that the feeling of
ownership enhances existing visuoproprioceptive spatial biases and
that synchronous stroking causes proprioceptive drift in the RHI.
It is widely assumed that ‘‘proprioceptive drifts can be used as a
behavioural proxy’’ [8] to assess the occurrence and also the
strength of the subjective feeling to own the rubber hand.
In order to measure the time course of proprioceptive drift, we
tested participants in a variant of the RHI paradigm where we
interrupted stimulation regularly and recorded participant’s
perceived finger position. In accordance with existing models of
the RHI, we hypothesized that synchronous stroking would lead to
a gradual increase in proprioceptive drift. Smaller or no drifts were
expected in the asynchronous condition. In Experiment 1, we used
a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task and an adaptive
staircase method to determine finger position. Contrary to our
expectation, we observed proprioceptive drifts for both the syn-
chronous and the asynchronous stroking condition. We devised
a second experiment to clarify the role of intermittency and
synchrony of stroking in causing proprioceptive drifts, using a
more immediate (i.e., less time consuming) lateral position adjust-
ment task. In Experiment 2, different frequencies of measurement
were compared (every 10 s, 40 s, 120 s). Specifically, we were
interested in a possible effect of asynchronous stroking on pro-
prioceptive drift. Experiment 1 suggests such an effect, even if
none of the current models would predict it. Just vision of the hand
(without stroking) was added as an additional control condition.
Based on the results from Experiment 1, we hypothesized that
proprioceptive drifts occur for intermittent asynchronous stroking
but not for prolonged asynchronous stroking, which was con-
firmed by the results. We also hypothesized that proprioceptive
drift in the just vision condition is the same as synchronous
stroking, which was also confirmed. Frequency of measurement
during asynchronous stroking is the factor that best accounts for
any differences in proprioceptive drift observed.
Our findings show a dissociation of proprioceptive drift and the
reported feeling of ownership and suggest that these two pheno-
mena result from different processes of multisensory integration.
We argue that prolonged synchronous stroking involves proprio-
ceptive drift in the RHI, but that this drift is already present even
without stroking. To the contrary, prolonged asynchronous
stroking seems to interfere with visual-proprioceptive integration
of the visual location of the rubber hand with the proprioceptive
location on the own hand. We argue, that this leads to a less biased
percept of the proprioceptive location of one’s own hand away
from the location of the (visual) rubber hand. Shorter intervals of
asynchronous stroking cannot break this integration process so
that the drift is still present, despite of the absence of feelings of
ownership.
Materials and Methods
Both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were approved by the
Ethics Committee of the University Clinics Tu ¨bingen, Germany.
Informed written consent was obtained from all participants
involved in the study.
Experiment 1: The feeling of hand ownership under
frequent measurements
Participants. 20 paid participants took part in the study (age
range: 20–51; median age: 25; 13 female; 17 right-handed, 1 left-
handed and 2 ambidextrous, as by self-report). None had pre-
viously participated in a RHI study and they were naı ¨ve to the
purpose of the experiment. 1 had previously heard about the
illusion.
Experimental Set-Up. The experiment was conducted using
a computer controlled set-up, where two PHANToM force-
feedback devices (SensAble Technologies) served as robot arms to
stroke both the participant’s and the rubber hand with custom-
made paintbrush endings (see Fig. 1). A commercially available left
rubber hand (10 cm width, 14 cm length from artificial sleeve to
fingertip) was placed 17 cm to the right of the participant’s real left
hand, such that the middle finger of the rubber hand was aligned
with the body midline. The real hand was occluded with a matt
black cloth. The rubber hand was visible through a 15615 cm
semi-silvered mirror that appeared as a transparent glass if the
light below the mirror was switched on (this means that the rubber
hand and ca. 7 cm of its lower arm were visible). If the light was
switched off, the semi-transparent mirror turned into an opaque
mirror, such that the rubber hand was not visible anymore and the
reflection of a screen image (CRT monitor mounted on top of the
set-up, see Fig. 1) appeared to be in the participant’s field of view
instead. This technique was used to project a white dot to the left
or right of the participant’s left hidden index finger tip. The dot
was the only thing visible in the dark room during measurement.
Throughout the experiment, the participant’s hand was never
visible. Participants had to judge (forced choice) if the dot was to
the left or to the right of perceived position of their unseen index
finger (see also ‘‘Procedure’’ below). The dots appeared in the
range from 11 cm to the left to 23 cm to the right of the real index
finger (with the rubber hand index finger being placed at 17 cm).
Answers were given with the right hand (that was also outside
the participant’s view, Fig. 1, top right). In order to correct for
differences in shape and size between the participant’s and the
rubber hand, prior to the experiment we used a calibration
procedure by recording the position of 16 salient points on the real
and the rubber hand (i.e., the joints, Fig. 1, bottom right). Strokes
were then morphed from the rubber hand to the real hand by
linearly interpolating between two neighboring such salient points.
Random continuous trajectories of stroking (500 ms–1000 ms
strokes) between neighboring points on the hand were generated.
In the synchronous condition, corresponding strokes were applied
synchronously to both hands. As the paths followed by the paint-
brush were random, the stimulation and the velocity of the
paintbrush varied with the distance between points and the paths
were highly unpredictable. Unpredictability has been linked to the
strength of experienced ownership. Experienced subjects reported
during piloting that this procedure gives rise to a striking and
intense ownership illusion when compared to other procedures,
such as manual stroking. In the asynchronous condition, random
patterns (spatially and temporally unrelated) were used.
Procedure. Participants were divided into 2 groups of 10
each. The first group was tested in the synchronous, the second in
the asynchronous stroking condition. Participants were exposed to
stroking with measurements of finger proprioception every 10 s for
7 min (timeline: Fig. 1, bottom). For the measurement the light
was switched off under the semi-silvered mirror (no vision of the
rubber hand or the frame of the monitor or the mirror) and the
visual probe dot was projected into the field of view at roughly the
same height as the participant’s unseen hand and the visible
rubber hand. Participants had to respond (forced choice) whether
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the invisible left index finger of their own hand. The location of
the dot changed at every trial according to two alternating simple
up-down staircase algorithms (staircase steps: 4 cm and 1 cm) [9].
The staircases move the dot at each step into the opposite
direction that the participants report, so that, over time, the dot
moves closer to the participant’s perceived lateral location of the
index finger. Both staircases started at the participant’s real index
finger position at 0 cm. Before stroking, participants’ proprio-
ceptively felt finger position was tested in two pre-tests (one in the
dark, one when seeing the rubber hand). At the end of the
experiment, participants had to fill out the RHI questionnaire [1],
supplemented with a German translation.
Experiment 2: Frequency of measurement affects
proprioceptive drift
Participants. Thirty paid participants took part in the study
(age range: 18–40; median age: 26; 18 female; 27 right-handed
and 3 left-handed, as by self-report). None of them had previously
participated in a RHI study and they were naı ¨ve to the purpose of
the study. Six had previously heard about the illusion.
Experimental Set-Up. The set-up was the same as in Experi-
ment 1. To make the stimulation more similar to the manual
stimulation used in other studies (e.g., [1]), a 500 ms pause was
made between each 500 ms stroke, moving the paintbrush to start
the next stroke at a randomly chosen neighboring point. In the
synchronous condition, strokes on both hands corresponded in
both space and time. In the asynchronous condition, strokes were
both temporally out of phase and spatially random.
Procedure. Participants were divided into 3 groups of 10. To
decrease inter-participant variability, each group was tested in
both the synchronous and the asynchronous stroking condition in
two blocks that were counter-balanced across participants. Given
that the first experiment had shown fast convergence of pro-
prioceptive drifts, visuotactile stimulation was shortened to 2 min
in Experiment 2 (most participants experience ownership of
the rubber hand within 11 sec [10]). For all groups, perceived
finger location in darkness was measured before the onset of
stimulation as a baseline measure. In the 16120 Group, finger
proprioception was additionally measured only once after the
full length of stimulation, analogous to most RHI studies (e.g.,
[1]). In the 3640 Group stroking was interrupted three times
(after each 40 sec of stroking) for proprioceptive measurements
and in the 12610 Group such measurements were taken twelve
times (after each 10 sec of stroking). This means that the total
duration of stimulation is equal in all three groups; the inter-
ruption for measurement is added to the total duration of the
experiment.
We now used an adjustment task as this is a faster way to assess
the perceived finger location compared to the 2 AFC task used in
Experiment 1. That is, participants had to adjust the position of a
projected dot to match the lateral perceived position of their
occluded left index finger in darkness, using the scroll wheel of the
computer mouse with the right hand. Only the dot was visible
during the adjustment procedure, but not the rubber hand, the
frame of the monitor or the mirror. The adjustment was repeated
three times each trial and the average of these three adjustments
was taken as a data point. The dots could be moved on a
horizontal line that ranged from 17 cm to the left to 19 cm to
the right of the real index finger position (rubber hand index finger
17 cm to the right). The initial position of these dots was
randomized. Relative proprioceptive drift was computed by sub-
tracting the perceived finger position from the pre-test in darkness
measured separately for each participant at the beginning of each
block.
An additional control condition without stroking (vision only)
was added as a third experimental block in the 16120 Group and
the 12610 Group. No questionnaire ratings were collected in
these experiments to avoid biasing participants’ perceptual
judgments when repeating the measurements in the subsequent
blocks of asynchronous and synchronous stroking.
Figure 1. The RHI set-up used in the study. Two PHANToM force-feedback devices with paintbrush endings stroke the subject’s occluded hand
and the visible rubber hand. Probe dots are projected into the visual field using the CRT and a semi-silvered mirror. Top left: Schematic diagram of the
set-up. Top right: photograph of the set-up. Bottom left: time-line of the procedure. Bottom right: patterns of stimulation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021659.g001
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Experiment 1: The feeling of hand ownership under
frequent measurements
As in the study by Botvinick and Cohen [1], the only
questionnaire items with a significantly positive rating were items
Q1–Q3 in the synchronous stroking group (all three p,0.05 in
sign test; Q1 and Q3 after correction for repeated measures,
p=0.018) but not in the asynchronous stroking control group (see
Fig. 2). Perceived finger position at the end of the trial was
computed by fitting a cumulative Gaussian to the last 12 responses
(last 2 min of exposure) to determine the location at which subjects
cannot distinguish whether a dot is to the left or to the right of
their index finger (50% point of the fitted Gaussian) [11]. A
proprioceptive drift towards the rubber hand at the end of the
experiment, relative to the pre-test in the dark, was measured in
both the synchronous (6.5062.3 cm, one-tailed t test, t(9)=2.7,
p=0.013) and the asynchronous condition (3.9361.88 cm; t(9)=
2.0, p=0.039; values given in average 6 s.e.m.). The difference in
proprioceptive drift between the conditions was not significant
(two-sample t-test, t(18)=0.8, p=0.425).
The results from the questionnaire replicate the results on
feelings of ownership of the rubber hand as it has been reported by
Botvinick and Cohen [1]. This confirms that the RHI can be
induced using the described set-up and particularly the employed
procedure with frequent measurements; feelings of ownership only
occur with synchronous but not asynchronous stroking. A sig-
nificant difference in proprioceptive drift between the synchronous
and asynchronous conditions, however, could not be replicated;
proprioceptive drift occurred in both conditions. This result has
two possible explanations. Firstly, frequent measurement could
dissociate proprioceptive drift from the feeling of ownership of the
rubber hand. Secondly, the experimental procedure (adaptive
forced-choice task) could confound or bias the patterns of drift
usually reported (i.e., an adaptive procedure may be too slow to
capture the rapid perceptual changes).
Experiment 2: Frequency of measurement affects
proprioceptive drift
The result of Experiment 1 suggests that frequent measure-
ment of finger position dissociates proprioceptive drift from the
experience to own the rubber hand as reported in a questionnaire
in the RHI. In order to verify this, the second experiment mea-
sured proprioceptive drift across three groups of participants
using different frequencies of measurement (every 10 seconds, 40
seconds and 120 seconds). To exclude any possible biases resulting
from the relatively slow experimental adaptive staircase procedure,
a more quick and direct position adjustment task was used (see
Methods). Additionally, a ‘vision only’ condition was introduced as
control condition to assess the importance of tactile stroking.
According to existing accounts of the RHI, it would be expected
that synchronous stroking brings about gradual proprioceptive
drift that is significantly higher than the drift found for asyn-
chronous stroking or when stroking is omitted in the ‘‘vision only’’
condition. Furthermore, from the existing literature prior to
Experiment 1 there was no reason to predict that the frequency of
measurement would compromise the effect of drift, which however
turns out to be the critical factor.
In all groups, a proprioceptive drift of approximately 5–6 cm
was found in the synchronous stroking condition at the end of
2 min of stimulation (Fig. 3), and this drift gradually built up over
time. If stimulation was continuous for 120 s, there was no sizeable
proprioceptive drift in the asynchronous condition (Fig. 3, top;
0.9860.69 cm, as opposed to 5.961.59 cm in the synchronous
condition; all values are mean 6 s.e.m.). This replicates earlier
results in the literature (e.g., [1]). The drifts observed for
Figure 2. Results from Experiment 1. Left: Proprioceptive drift did not differ significantly between the synchronous and the asynchronous group,
mean and s.e.m. N=20. Right: The questionnaire results confirm that the procedure of interrupting stimulation every 10 s brings about the
ownership illusion. Boldface questionnaire items indicate the occurrence of the ownership illusion. In the synchronous condition, questionnaire items
Q1 and Q3 are rated significantly positive (p=0.002; after Bonferroni correction for multiple measures: p=0.018). Questionnaire item Q2 is nearly
significantly positive (one negative reply, p=0.022; after Bonferroni correction for multiple measures: p=0.195). Error bars: 25 percentile275
percentile; N=20.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021659.g002
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unexpected pattern. As the frequency of measurement increased,
proprioceptive drift also started to occur in the asynchronous
stroking condition. While this drift was still lower than in the
synchronous stroking condition in the 3640 Group (2.756
1.31 cm vs. 5.8461.38 cm, Fig. 3, middle), the difference in drift
between synchronous and asynchronous stroking disappeared in
the 12610 Group (5.4561.48 cm vs. 4.8161.44 cm, Fig. 3,
bottom) as if the frequency of measurement modulated the drift in
the asynchronous condition, but not the synchronous condition. A
362 mixed ANOVA with drift as dependent variable, group as
between subjects factor (16120 s, 3640 s, 12610 s), and mode of
stroking as within subjects factor (synchronous, asynchronous)
confirmed that the interaction between the frequency of mea-
surement (between groups) and the mode of stroking (within
groups) was significant (F(2,27)=3.9, p=0.031). There was also a
main effect of the mode of stroking, but not of the frequency of
measurement (F(1,27)=8.9, p=0.006, F(2,27)=0.5, p=0.635).
The main effect of stroking was due to the 12610 Group and the
3640 Group, but not the 12610 Group (paired-sample t tests
t(9)=2.7, p=0.024, t(9)=2.5, p=0.034, t(9)=0.6, p=0.592).
The equal levels in proprioceptive drift for both synchronous and
asynchronous stroking in the 12610 Group confirmed the
dissociation between visuotactile synchrony and the proprioceptive
drift effects under frequent measurement that were already found
in Experiment 1.
A possible explanation for this surprising result is that asyn-
chronous stroking interferes with the integration process that
leads to effects of vision on proprioception in any situation of
visuoproprioceptive conflict (i.e., seeing a hand displaced from its
real location, e.g. [5]). The longer such asynchronous stroking
lasts, the stronger is the evidence against the ‘‘unity assumption’’
[12], that is the assumption that the proprioceptive and the visual
sensations belong together. This unity assumption is a pre-requisite
for visuoproprioceptive integration to occur. If vision and pro-
prioception would not be sensed as belonging together, no inte-
gration of the sensations would occur and thus no drift would be
observed.
To further test the hypothesis that asynchronous stroking is
necessary to diminish the effect of drift by breaking the unity
assumption, we measured proprioceptive drift in a condition
without any stroking (i.e., only vision of the rubber hand). If
asynchronous stroking is necessary to diminish the drift effect at
the end of 2 minutes of tactile stimulation, it should still be present
in the vision only condition. We tested the vision only condition in
both the 16120 Group and the 12610 Group. Figure 4 shows the
results from this additional condition; in agreement with the
hypothesis outlined above, the drift observed in this condition was
as strong as the drift in the synchronous stroking condition in both
groups and stronger than the drift in the asynchronous stroking
condition in the 16120 group (6.4761.10 cm; 12610 s: 3.096
1.46 cm). A 263 mixed ANOVA with group (16120, 12610) as
between subjects factor and mode of presentation (synchronous,
asynchronous, just vision) as within subjects factor showed no main
effect of the group (F(1,18)=0, p=0.990) or the mode of pre-
sentation (F(2,36)=2.4, p=0.109), but a significant interaction
between frequency of measurement and mode of presenta-
tion (F(2,36)=7.8, p=0.002). Two one-way repeated measures
ANOVAs with mode of presentation (synchronous, asynchronous,
just vision) as factor showed a significant difference in proprio-
ceptive drift within the 16120 group (F(2,18)=7.6, p=0.004) but
not in the 12610 group (F(2,18)=1.7, p=0.22). The interaction is
due to the asynchronous stroking condition; additional paired
sample t-tests showed a significant difference between the asyn-
chronous and just vision conditions (t(9)=4.8, p,0.001) but no
difference between the synchronous and just vision conditions
(t(9)=0.3, p=0.76). This supports the hypothesis that differences
in drift reported in earlier studies are driven by asynchronous
Figure 3. Perceived finger position relative to pre-test across
time for the different groups. There is always a drift when
synchronous stroking occurs. Surprisingly, there is also proprioceptive
drift if asynchronous stroking is interrupted regularly. Error bars: s.e.m.
n=10 in all three groups, dotted line indicates 5 cm line for readability,
N=30.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021659.g003
Figure 4. Proprioceptive drift for synchronous stroking,
asynchronous stroking and just vision. Perceived finger position
relative to pre-test at the end of the block for the 16120 Group and the
12610 Group. The drift measured for just vision is the same as when the
drift measured for synchronous stroking. Error bars: s.e.m. n=10 in both
groups, N=20.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021659.g004
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chronous and the just vision condition was correlated (p=0.030,
Pearson’s correlation coefficient r=0.49; data pooled from 16120
Group and 12610 Group), further supporting the hypothesis that
proprioceptive drift in the RHI and proprioceptive drift in the
just vision condition are one and the same phenomenon. The
apparently lower levels of drift in the just vision condition of the
12610 group is not statistically significant (compared to just vision
in 16120 group: t(18)=1.75, p=0.097).
In Experiment 2, no questionnaire ratings were recorded
in-between the different conditions (synchronous, asynchronous,
vision only) to avoid biasing the participants’ responses in sub-
sequent conditions and also because two of the three relevant
questionnaire items (Q1 and Q2) refer to the localization of touch
and are thus not applicable to the vision only condition. However,
anecdotally, the vast majority of participants reported a strong
feeling of ownership in the synchronous condition, but not in the
asynchronous condition or vision only condition in the debriefing
after completion of the experiment, irrespective of the frequency of
measurement. In agreement with this result, Longo et al. [13] have
reported that just vision of a rubber hand does not elicit the feeling
of ownership.
There were no order effects for the order of synchronous or
asynchronous exposure in Experiment 2. A 362 mixed ANOVA
with group (16120, 3640, 12610) as between subjects factor and
mode of presentation (synchronous, asynchronous) as within
subjects factor showed no main effect of the group (F(2,27)=0.4,
p=0.635) the mode of presentation (F(1,27)=1.3, p=0.260) or
their interaction (F(2,27)=0.1, p=0.919). As just vision was
always the third condition, it is confounded with order, so it is
impossible to test for order effects during this block.
In Experiment 2, we observed proprioceptive drift of equal
magnitudes not only if the participant’s hand and the rubber hand
were stroked synchronously, as it would be expected from current
accounts of the RHI, but also when no stroking was applied and
even if asynchronous stroking was interrupted every 10 s. The only
condition that does not lead to such a drift and that thus accounts
for all differences in drift levels observed is prolonged asynchro-
nous stroking (Fig. 4). This result cannot be an artifact of the
frequent measurement procedure (response bias). The presenta-
tion of dots was random from an interval centered on the real
position of the participant’s hand. If the initial position of dots
would bias the outcome of the adjustment procedure, this bias
should, if at all, bias the results towards the position of the real
index finger. Response bias can therefore not explain the pro-
prioceptive drift towards the rubber hand in the 12610 s group.
The drift results from the exposure to the visually displaced rubber
hand. For these reasons, we propose the possibility that asyn-
chrony is interpreted as evidence against the ‘‘unity assumption’’
[12] necessary for cross-modal integration. In this interpretation,
asynchronous stroking counters visuoproprioceptive integration,
independent of the experience of ownership of the rubber hand,
i.e., the two measures are dissociated.
Discussion
Proprioceptive drift and the ownership illusion do not go
hand in hand
It is known that visual-proprioceptive integration can bias
perceived limb position in ways that are similar to the
proprioceptive drift observed in the RHI without the feeling of
ownership of the fake hand (e.g., [6]). So what is new about our
result? Firstly, we show that drift in the prolonged asynchronous
stroking condition is not only significantly smaller than the drift in
the synchronous stroking condition, as expected. It is also sig-
nificantly smaller than drift in the vision only condition and
intermittent asynchronous stroking condition (Fig. 4). This suggests
that prolonged visuotactile asynchrony has an effect on the
perception of hand location in the presence of a visuopropriocep-
tive conflict (less bias towards the visual position of the hand). Even
though the possibility that differences in drift may be due to
asynchronous stroking has been mentioned previously [14], this is
not usually considered to be the case.
Secondly, we directly compared the synchronous and the vision
only condition and could thus show that visuoproprioceptive
integration and proprioceptive drift in the RHI are equally strong
and correlated within participants. Proprioceptive drift gradually
increases whenever it occurs, even without feeling ownership of the
rubber hand. This indicates that synchronous stroking may not
induce any proprioceptive drift additional to the drift resulting
from visuoproprioceptive integration. As the subjects did not
report experience of ownership in the just vision condition, there is
dissociation between the two phenomena, where low drift requires
prolonged asynchronous stroking, and the feeling of owning the
rubber hand requires visuotactile synchronous stroking.
Some findings from earlier studies support our conclusion that
proprioceptive drift in the RHI may not be caused by synchronous
stroking, but rather that its lack may be caused by asynchronous
stroking in the control condition. Tsakiris and Haggard’s [2]
results on the time course of proprioceptive drift appear to involve
a certain amount of drift also in the asynchronous condition. This
is in line with our results from the 3640 Group (Fig. 3, middle)
that tests a similar frequency of measurement (every 40 s vs. every
60 s). Durgin, Evans, Dunphy, Klostermann and Simmons [15]
have shown that proprioceptive drift and the feeling of ownership
occur in a situation that did not involve tactile stimulation at all,
but instead used visual ‘‘stimulation’’ with a laser, which calls into
question the role of tactile stimulation by stroking in the RHI.
However, this visual laser-stimulation still brings about the feeling
of ownership and thus does not pose a direct challenge to the
presumed link between the feeling of ownership and the pro-
prioceptive drift; the drift measured for laser-stimulation could still
have been causally related to the processes that make participants
experience ownership over the artificial hand.
Underlying Mechanisms
Existing accounts of the RHI assume processes of multisensory
integration where visuotactile synchrony provides information in
favor of the unity assumption, which causes both the feeling of
ownership of the rubber hand and the proprioceptive drift towards
the rubber hand. Thus, proprioceptive drift during the RHI
is explained as a ‘‘three-way interaction between vision, touch, and
proprioception’’ [1]. That is, vision and proprioception are
merged (leading to drift and the feeling of ownership) only or
stronger in case there is congruent tactile-visual interaction from
synchronous stroking. Botvinick and Cohen [1] propose a ‘‘con-
straint-satisfaction process operating between vision, touch and
proprioception […] structured by the correlations normally
holding among these modalities’’ (p. 756) as a common cause of
the drift and the feeling of ownership. If there was such a direct
link, synchronous tactile stimulation should increase the drift
found for just vision or intermittent asynchronous stroking, as
these latter conditions do not involve feeling of ownership of the
rubber hand.
The alternative explanation offered by our results is that
differences in proprioceptive drift, such as in Fig. 3 (top), are
driven by asynchronous stroking in the control condition that
seems to provide evidence against the ‘‘unity assumption’’ [12]
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of proprioception, e.g., [5]), rather than synchronous stroking
causing it. The interruptions we introduced to measure the
proprioceptive drift have the unexpected effect to also interrupt
the accumulation of evidence against the unity assumption (note
that it is not absolute duration of stroking that modulates the drift
in the asynchronous condition; the absolute duration of stroking is
kept constant across groups). If the proprioceptive signal is
weakened over time (participants keep their hand still), there is
also a simple explanation for the gradual increase in propriocep-
tive drift. It has been reported that the proprioception of hand
position drifts towards the body midline when the hand is kept still
(e.g., [16,17]), which supports the outlined possibility.
This possibility afforded by our results is counter-intuitive at
first; it seems plausible that the experienced acquisition of a
displaced limb (feeling of ownership) should involve a spatial
update. However, a closer look at the literature in cognitive
neuroscience reveals abundant evidence that for different cognitive
and behavioral domains, the body is perceived and used differently
(e.g., [14,18]). Our perceived body boundaries do not always
linearly map to how we move, coordinate and locate our body in
space. The proposal here is that the sensation of owning a rubber
hand does not cause any automatic update of the perceived
position of the body in space; that the processes underlying the
proprioceptive drift are independent of the visuotactile integration
that causes the feeling of ownership. From our results it cannot be
ruled out that the visuotactile integration may be a pre-requisite of
the feeling of ownership, but the feeling of ownership does not
itself influence the spatial update, nor does the spatial update itself
cause the feeling of ownership. The common comparison of
synchronous and asynchronous stroking leads to the erroneous
impression that the differences in proprioceptive drift and the
feeling of ownership are directly linked. Our results provide direct
evidence in favor of a dissociation of the two effects and their
underlying mechanisms.
Makin et al. ’s [3] model of peripersonal space can be reconciled
with this account if some modifications are applied. The authors
assume that visuotactile synchrony provides positive feedback on
existing processes of visuoproprioceptive integration. Under this
assumption, the model cannot explain our results. However, the
weakening of visuoproprioceptive integration by asynchronous
stroking can be interpreted as negative feedback on the visual
weight in their model of peripersonal space. With this modifica-
tion, their model can account for our results. The same holds true
for Tsakiris’ [8] preliminary model, which extends Makin et al. ’s
model by introducing a module that compares visual information
with the current state of the body prior to multisensory integration.
Such a revision would mean to implement the counter-intuitive
result suggested by our study, i.e., that there is no direct con-
nection between proprioceptive drift and the synchronous stroking
that brings about the feeling of ownership of the rubber hand.
We cannot without further evidence assume that the results we
found for visual judgments of perceived hand position generalize
to other techniques to measure perceived finger location, like inter-
manual reaches. We can only hypothesize that asynchronous
stroking in the most common control condition for the RHI has a
general negative effects on the visual capture of proprioception.
Using Proprioceptive Drift as a Proxy for the Ownership
Illusion
Proprioceptive drift is thought of as a stable behavioral correlate
of the feeling of ownership, as reflected for instance in Kammers et
al. ’s assessment that ‘‘numerous studies have demonstrated that
perceptual judgments are affected by the RHI’’ ([14], p. 205). It
has been reproduced in a variety of extensions and variations of
the original RHI experiment, using both inter-manual reaches
(e.g., [9,14,15,19–25]) and visual estimations of perceived finger
position in space (e.g., [2,14,22,26–33]). A similar change in
perceived body location has been shown in a full-body variant of
the illusion [34]. Several studies have confirmed that the strength
of the feeling of ownership correlates with the magnitude of
proprioceptive drift (e.g., [1,27,28]).
At first glance, a direct causal link, i.e., that both measures are
driven by synchronous stroking, seems the most parsimonious
explanation for this correlation. Even though theories of body
image often stress the multi-facetted nature of human body per-
ception (e.g., [27]), models and experiments frequently imple-
ment simplified assumptions. Given that the correlation between
proprioceptive drift and the subjective feeling of rubber hand
ownership appears to be so robust, it has been proposed that
‘‘proprioceptive drifts can be used as a behavioural proxy’’ [8] of
the experience to own the rubber hand. It is habitual to refer
interchangeably to the feeling of ownership and the proprioceptive
drift as ‘‘the’’ RHI and interpret results in terms of a causal link
between the two or to use the proprioceptive drift as a measure of
the RHI (e.g., [2,14,19,25,26,30–32]).
If there is no direct causal connection between the feeling of
ownership and the proprioceptive drift, as we claim, what is the
source of the correlation between proprioceptive drift and the
feeling of ownership previously observed? A more remote common
cause can explain correlation in the absence of direct causal links.
For instance, more ‘‘visual’’ participants may be more susceptible
to both visual capture of proprioception and to the feeling that
they own the rubber hand. Alternatively, proprioceptive drift may
be a pre-requisite for the occurrence of the feeling of owner-
ship, even if the feeling of ownership does not influence the
proprioceptive drift. In either case, the practice of using pro-
prioceptive drift as a proxy for the feeling of ownership would be
problematic. If it was admissible to assess the feeling of ownership
by proxy of the proprioceptive drift, we could conclude from our
results that body ownership is modulated by the frequency of
measurement in asynchronous stroking (Fig. 3). Only the com-
plementary questionnaire ratings (Fig. 2) show that this is not true.
Doubts similar to ours about a direct causal link between the
feeling of ownership and the proprioceptive drift as a proxy have
been expressed previously (cf. Makin et al. [3] for an overview).
Observing visual capture of hand proprioception, Holmes at al. [6]
warned that ‘‘reaching or proprioceptive biases are not reliable
objective measures of the rubber hand illusion itself’’ and that the
underlying processes may be ‘‘causally unrelated’’ (p. 700). How-
ever, so far, there have been no alternative explanations for the
differences in proprioceptive drift reliably reported and no direct
comparison of synchronous stroking and no stroking has been
made to call into question that synchronous stroking at least adds
to the effect.
How to measure the RHI
The doubts that our results cast on the validity of using
proprioceptive drift as a proxy to measure the intensity of feeling of
ownership in the RHI leads to a more general question of how the
RHI can be quantified.
Everyone who has experienced the subjective feeling of body
ownership in the RHI will confirm that it is most fascinating. This
experience is the true ‘‘illusion’’ in the RHI and, arguably, it is the
aspect of the illusion that has earned it its popular interest.
Scientifically speaking, however, this dimension is the most
difficult to tackle. Beside questionnaires, as in the original study
[1], vividness ratings have been used to directly quantify the
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enquiry into the subjective dimension of the RHI has been
performed by Longo et al. [27], using a 27-item questionnaire on a
large participant population to identify different phenomenological
components in the illusion. Longo et al. [27] argue that the fact
that ‘‘components of experiences are selectively related to pro-
prioceptive biases attests to [their method’s] validity’’ (p. 995). It is
important to recognize the value of such a psychometric approach
as a tool in its own right; their psychometric results stand out as
a novel approach to address complex questions of subjective
experience in perception research, even if the ‘‘behavioral ground-
ing’’ is here called into question.
Beside proprioceptive drift, a number of other behavioral and
physiological measures have been found to be affected in the RHI
experiment, including skin conductance response (SCR) to threat
[20,35,37–39], skin temperature [36], rate of self-recognition [40]
and cross-modal congruency [33]. While it is interesting in itself
that synchronous stroking affects these variables, it seems parti-
cularly attractive to interpret changes in these variables as an
indication of how strongly a subject feels ownership of the rubber
hand. Indirect measurement would allow bypassing problems
inherent in the direct quantification of subjective experience (e.g.,
suggestion, variability due to beliefs and top-down influences). The
results presented in this paper demonstrate the dangers of such an
endeavor. The question that remains is: When a behavioral or
physiological measure has been shown to correlate with the
strength of felt ownership, if and under which circumstances can it
be used as a measure or proxy for how strongly hand ownership is
experienced? The more plausibly it can be argued that the same
mechanism brings about both the feeling of ownership and the
behavioral correlate in question, the stronger can one be seen as
an indicator of the other. For instance, SCR has been shown to be
closely associated with changes in subjective affective states across
many contexts, not just the RHI, which makes it plausible that
there may be a link. However, as long as the generative me-
chanisms of the RHI are not fully understood, there can be no
certainty about causal links. It is thus advisable to be careful with
using behavioral or physiological correlates as exclusive measure
or proxy for the RHI (supplementary subjective measures, such as
vividness ratings, can be used). Findings should be interpreted
conservatively, taking into consideration the possibility of corre-
lation without causation.
The same principal limitations apply to neural and neuro-
behavioral correlates of the illusion (e.g.,[10,22,31,32,41–43]); a
correlation is only meaningful in so far as it can be argued to be
causally linked to the phenomenon in question. For instance,
Ehrsson et al. [10] found activity in multisensory areas (premo-
tor cortex and intraparietal cortex) using functional magnetic
resonance imaging. They could not only show that vividness
ratings correlate with the neural activity but also that the onset of
activity in these areas corresponds to the reported onset of the
subjective feeling of ownership. These kinds of additional findings
indicate that the activity is probably not due to visuopropriocep-
tive integration alone. On the other hand, Tsakiris et al. [32]
found a correlation between activity in the right insular cortex
(positron emission topography) and the RHI in a study that
exclusively measured proprioceptive drift. This study has been
interpreted as evidence that the insula cortex plays a key role in
producing the feeling of ownership (e.g., [8]). Had Tsakiris et al.
[32] recorded complementary vividness ratings and analyzed the
relation between neural activity and different processes of mul-
tisensory integration, their findings would be a much more solid
basis for conclusions about the neural correlates of subjectively
experienced body ownership.
A different approach to study the RHI is to test it in patients with
impaired body image. On the one hand, schizophrenia [44,45] and
anorexia nervosa [46] have been found to bias the experience of the
illusion. On the other hand, inducing the illusion has been reported
to modulate tactile extinction [47] and even the experience of limb
ownership in amputees [20,48]. Such research on the RHI in the
context of neuro- or psychopathology bears great potential for
therapeutic approaches in the spirit of the ‘‘mirror box’’ therapy for
phantom limbs [49]. Yet, if the mechanisms of body ownership
remain unknown, such an approach may raise more questions than
it answers from the perspectiveof basic cognitive neuroscience, even
if it serves well for therapeutic intervention.
Conclusion
In the RHI, a drift in the proprioceptively sensed hand position
has been reported to correlate with the subjective feeling of owning
the rubber hand (e.g., [1]). This drift has been readily accepted and
widely used as a proxy for the subjective feeling of ownership. Our
results show that asynchronous stroking in the control condition has
a negative effect on this drift and may indeed be responsible for
changes in proprioceptive drift previously reported in the literature.
The processes of spatial updating of the body in space and the
subjective feeling of body ownership are dissociated in our para-
digm, which suggests that separate mechanisms of multisensory
integration underlie the two effects (spatial update and feeling of
ownership). The effects of asynchronous stroking on different
measures used in RHI experiments has so far not been explicitly
investigated. Current models of the RHI need to be revised to
explain this result. Furthermore, our results suggest that the practice
of using proprioceptive drift to assess feelings of ownership is
problematic.
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